YKMUN 2024

ANTALYA PRIVITE YUKSELIS HIGH SCHOOL MODEL UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE

RUSSO-UKRAINIAN WAR

Agenda Item:

Open Agenda

Co-Under Secretary General:

Yiğit Cirim

Co-Under Secretary General:

Yasemin Dilek

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Letter from the Secretary General

Dear Delegates,

First of all, it is my utmost pleasure to serve you as the Secretary General for the Antalya Private Yükseliş High School Model United Nations Conference. I am more than proud of making this conference happen with my friends and waiting with a great enthusiasm to see every participant.

MUN's are great opportunities to discover your talents, improve your formal communication abilities and understand how policy is implemented. For these reasons, as a great academic team it is our mission to transfer our experiences to the new generation and to ensure that MUNs affect them in a similar way.

Lastly as an executive team, we put everything we had into this conference. My most sincere regards. Welcome to Ascend of Prestigiousness!

Yusuf Almış

Letter from Co-Under-Secretary-General

Dear Delegates,

I welcome all of you to YKMUN'24. It's a big honor to serve as Co- Under Secretary General of Russo-Ukraine Conflict, which is a Specialized Committee that you will enjoy a lot and think furtherly while taking actions.

My name is Yiğit Cirim and I am a high school student at Antalya Anatolian High School. I can not express my feelings for finding myself in that amazing academic team. Dear executive team worked for you to have good memories and experience you can be ensure of that and also we worked hard at night and morning with my teammate, my sister and your dear Co-Under Secretary General Yasemin Dilek in order to make you experience a wonderful committee. We hope all of you are eager to end that conflict or maintain the process and maybe create a World War III. To be honest, I really wonder about your steps and movements.

For the topic; we chose Russo-Ukraine Conflict, we thought that it was the most current topic and it did not include too much historical content. It started on February 24, 2022,

with Russian President Vladimir Putin's announcement of a "special military operation" in Ukraine. He denied the existence of Ukraine as a republic and he asserted that Ukraine is governed by Neo-Nazies. After that speech, bombs started to attack Ukrainian cities. From that date invasion has been continuing non-stop. Now it's in your hands to decide the fate of Ukraine and Russia and generally the World.
Last but not least, **I highly recommend you to read the Study Guide** which we prepared for you by mixing our nights and mornings with Yasemin. It would provide you the best understanding for the topic and show you possible ways that you will follow. **If you have any and any and any kind of questions about the committee or problems with the guide please do not hesitate to get contact with me via my number:**
0542 180 48 70
Best regards,
Yigit CİRİM

Letter from Co-Under-Secretary-General
Dear representatives,
I welcome you all to the first annual session of YKMUN'24, we are really excited to have you here. It is a great honour to be standing here as your Co-Under Secretary General of the Russo-Ukrainian War and being able to give you participants a wonderful experience. We are hoping to make a fun committee and make this conference an unforgettable memory for you all.
I am Yasemin Dilek and I am an 11th grader in Adem Tolunay Anatolian High School. The words will not be enough for me to express the amazingness of our Executive team and I am very grateful to be taking a part in this conference and having the chance to present you this spectacular committee. My dear friend, my little bro Yiğit Cirim and I worked and thought really hard for this committee so I am also grateful to have him beside me and him being there for me. As he explained in his speech, the things that we want from you are clear as it can be. In this committee a future of a nation will be in your hands. It can result in many problems such as starting a new World War so we want you all to think every one of your moves really carefully and act smarter than the other side to achieve something useful for the sake of Ukraine/Russia.
Lastly; if you have any kind of doubts or questions, feel free to contact one of us at any costs. And ofcourse, do not forget to **read the Study Guide** before coming into the committee because all of you will have crucial parts in every step of the way and that will affect the majority. We want you all to be active during the conference. **If you want to contact me for anything about the committee, here is my number;**
0530 310 18 09
Best Regards,
Yasemin DILEK

Subtleties and Significant Terms of Committee

1- You will represent the Prime Ministers or Presidents of countries and you will be fully authorized to take actions. We did not want to make you suffer by making you just delegates so you are presidents or prime ministers from now on. You can hang yourself or you can make assassinations to other presidents or prime ministers if you want :))

2- About directives; we are going to expect directives from you but not too much. When our committee needs to take actions you are going to write committee directives. We do not expect personal directives from you but if you need it in a specific case, all of you have just one personal directive right in the whole conference. But we recommend you to use it in a needed time because you just have one chance to use it effectively.

3- As a reminder our purpose is to provide world peace but it depends on your actions in the committee. According to your progress we can get some updates and crises to solve because we want to make you enjoy and think a lot while taking actions. You will need to make press releases in some cases.

4- As the final document we expect a communique.

5- Finally you do not need to feel concern and fear about the committee procedure. We will explain all the details in the committee since it will be face to face, even though you have any concerns after our workshop all of them will be gone.

Step by Step to the Russia-Ukraine Conflict

In the early 1990s, Russian President Yeltsin's approach of "everyone take as much autonomy as you can" accelerated the process of the dissolution of the USSR. Because with this approach, Moscow transferred the power concentrated at the center to regional administrations.

However, the election of Putin in 2000 changed the course. What enabled Putin to win the presidential election in 2000 was not only his success on the ground but also his promise to re-centralize authority and make Russia a superpower again. This marked the beginning of a significant change in Russia's policy towards its surroundings. This date became the point at which Russia's reaction to the activities of the US, the EU, and NATO in its sphere of influence would change. After being elected president with a high vote percentage, Putin openly declared that he wanted to draw the former USSR members back into Moscow's strategic orbit and shape his policies accordingly.

This strategic approach signaled a turning point for countries like Ukraine, which had turned their direction towards the West and were of great geopolitical and strategic importance to Russia. At this point, we will discuss in more detail in the following sections how third parties such as the US, the EU, and NATO encouraged Ukraine in this process but ultimately left Ukraine alone when it faced the Russian Armed Forces with the desire to be part of a democratic, contemporary West. Now, let's briefly look at the major milestone events leading up to the invasion of Ukraine.

The first of these was Russia's intervention in Georgia. Perhaps the most important aspect of the Georgia intervention was that it allowed Putin's Russia to experience that it could violate international law and face no other sanctions than some limited economic sanctions and calls for restraint from power centers such as NATO, the EU, and the US. When evaluated from this perspective, the experience in Georgia served as a precursor to the intervention in Crimea, and the intervention in Crimea served as a precursor to the intervention in Ukraine.

a. World War I and the struggle for independence

The outbreak of World War I and the onset of hostilities between Russia and Austria-Hungary on August 1, 1914, had immediate repercussions for the Ukrainian subjects of both belligerent powers. In the Russian Empire, Ukrainian publications and cultural organizations were directly suppressed and prominent figures arrested or exiled. As Russian forces advanced into Galicia in September, the retreating Austrians executed thousands for suspected pro-Russian sympathies. After occupying Galicia, tsarist authorities took steps toward its total incorporation into the Russian Empire. They prohibited the Ukrainian language, closed down institutions, and prepared to liquidate the Greek Catholic church. The Russification campaign was cut short by the Austrian reconquest in spring 1915. Western Ukraine, however, continued to be a theatre of military operations and suffered great depredation.

The Russian Revolution of February 1917 brought into power the Provisional Government, which promptly introduced freedom of speech and assembly and lifted the tsarist restrictions on minorities. National life in Ukraine quickened with the revival of a Ukrainian press and the formation of numerous cultural and professional associations, as well as political parties. In March, on the initiative of these new organizations, the Central Rada ("Council") was

formed in Kyiv as a Ukrainian representative body. In April the more broadly convened All-Ukrainian National Congress declared the Central Rada to be the highest national authority in Ukraine and elected the historian Mykhaylo Hrushevsky as its head. The stated goal of the Central Rada was territorial autonomy for Ukraine and the transformation of Russia into a democratic, federative republic. Although the Provisional Government recognized Ukraine's right to autonomy and the Central Rada as a legitimate representative body, there were unresolved disputes over its territorial jurisdiction and political prerogatives. Locally, especially in the Russified cities of eastern Ukraine, the Rada also had to compete with the increasingly radical soviets of workers' and soldiers' deputies, whose support in the Ukrainian population, however, was quite limited.

Ukrainian-Russian relations deteriorated rapidly following the Bolshevik coup in Petrograd (now St. Petersburg) on November 7, 1917. The Central Rada refused to accept the new regime's authority over Ukraine and on November 20 proclaimed the creation of the Ukrainian National Republic, though still in federation with the new democratic Russia that was expected to emerge from the impending Constituent Assembly. The Bolsheviks, in turn, at the first All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets, held in Kharkiv in December, declared Ukraine to be a Soviet republic and formed a rival government. In January 1918 the Bolsheviks launched an offensive in the Left Bank and advanced on Kyiv. The Central Rada, already engaged in peace negotiations with the Central Powers, from whom it hoped for military assistance, proclaimed the total independence of Ukraine on January 22; on the same day, it passed a law establishing national autonomy for Ukraine's Jewish, Russian, and Polish minorities. Almost immediately, however, the government had to evacuate to the Right Bank, as Soviet troops occupied Kyiv. On February 9 Ukraine and the Central Powers signed the Peace Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (*see* treaties of Brest-Litovsk). A German-Austrian offensive dislodged the Bolsheviks from Kyiv in early March, and the Rada government returned to the capital. In April the Red Army retreated from Ukraine.

The socialist policies of the Ukrainian government, especially land nationalization, conflicted with the interest of the German high command to maximize the production of foodstuffs for its own war effort. On April 29, 1918, the Rada government was overthrown in a German-supported coup by Gen. Pavlo Skoropadsky. A collateral descendant of an 18th-century Cossack hetman, Skoropadsky assumed the title "hetman of Ukraine" (which he intended to become hereditary), abrogated all laws passed by the Rada, and established a conservative regime that relied on the support of landowners and the largely Russian urban middle class. The new government aroused intense opposition among Ukrainian nationalists, socialists, and the peasantry. To coordinate political opposition, the Ukrainian National Union was formed by the main parties and civic organizations, while the peasants manifested their hostility through rebellions and partisan warfare. The capitulation of Germany and Austria in November removed the main prop of Skoropadsky's regime, and the Ukrainian National Union formed the Directory of the Ukrainian National Republic to prepare for his overthrow. In a bid for the support of the Allied powers, Skoropadsky announced his intention to join in federation with a future non-Bolshevik Russia, triggering an uprising. On December 14 the hetman abdicated, and the Directory assumed control of government in Kyiv.

Even before the collapse of Austria-Hungary, an assembly of western Ukrainian political leaders in October 1918 declared the formation of a state, shortly thereafter named the Western Ukrainian National Republic, embracing Galicia, northern Bukovina, and Transcarpathia. On November 1 Ukrainian forces occupied Lviv. This act touched off a war with the Poles, who were themselves resolved to incorporate Galicia into a reconstituted Polish state. The Poles took Lviv on November 21, but most of Galicia remained under Ukrainian control, and the government, headed by Yevhen Petrushevych, transferred its seat to Stanyslaviv (now Ivano-Frankivsk). On January 22, 1919, an act of union of the two Ukrainian states was proclaimed in Kyiv, but actual political integration was prevented by the ongoing hostilities. These ultimately took an unfavourable turn for the Ukrainians, and by late July the Poles were in full control of Galicia. Petrushevych and his government evacuated to the Right Bank Ukraine and in the autumn went into exile in Vienna, where they continued diplomatic efforts against recognition of the Polish occupation.

In Kyiv the Directory that had taken power in December 1918—initially headed by Volodymyr Vynnychenko and from February 1919 by Symon Petlyura, who was also the commander in chief—officially restored the Ukrainian National Republic and revived the legislation of the Central Rada. Its attempts to establish an effective administration and to cope with the mounting economic and social problems were stymied, however, by the increasingly chaotic domestic situation and a hostile foreign environment. As the peasants became restless and the army demoralized, partisan movements led by unruly chieftains (commonly known as *otamany*) escalated in scope and violence. In addition, a substantial irregular force emerged under the command of the charismatic anarchist leader Nestor Makhno. In many places the government's authority was nominal or nonexistent. The Allied powers, including France, whose expeditionary force held Odessa, supported the Russian Whites, whose army was grouping around Gen. Anton Denikin in southern Russia.
As authority broke down in Ukraine, random violence increased. In particular, a ferocious wave of pogroms against the Jewish population left tens of thousands dead. The majority of the pogroms occurred in 1919, perpetrated by virtually all regular and irregular forces fighting in Ukraine—including Directory troops, the *otamany*, the White forces, and the Red Army—as well as civilians from both the peasant and landowning classes.

The Bolsheviks had already launched a new offensive in eastern Ukraine in December 1918. In February 1919 they again seized Kyiv. The Directory moved to the Right Bank and continued the struggle. In May Denikin launched his campaign against the Bolsheviks in the Left Bank; his progress westward through Ukraine was marked by terror, restoration of gentry land ownership, and the destruction of all manifestations of Ukrainian national life. As the Bolsheviks retreated yet again, Petlyura's Ukrainian forces and Denikin's White regiments both entered Kyiv on August 31, though the Ukrainians soon withdrew to avoid overt hostilities. From September to December the Ukrainian army fought with Denikin but, losing ground, began a retreat northwestward into Volhynia. There, confronted by the Poles in the west, the returning Red Army in the north, and the Whites in the south, the Ukrainian forces ceased regular military operations and turned to guerrilla warfare. In December Petlyura went to Warsaw to seek outside support. At the same time, the Bolsheviks were beating back Denikin's forces, and on December 16 they recaptured Kyiv. By February 1920 the Whites had been expelled from Ukrainian territory.

Petlyura's negotiations with the Polish government of Józef Piłsudski culminated in the Treaty of Warsaw, signed in April 1920; by the terms of the agreement, in return for Polish military aid, Petlyura surrendered Ukraine's claim to Galicia and western Volhynia. A Polish-Ukrainian campaign opened two days later, and on May 6 the joint forces occupied Kyiv. A counteroffensive mounted by the Bolsheviks brought them to the outskirts of Warsaw in August. The tides of war turned again as the Polish and Ukrainian armies drove back the Soviets and reentered the Right Bank. In October, however, Poland made a truce with the Soviets, and in March 1921 the Polish and Soviet sides signed the Treaty of Riga. Poland extended recognition to Soviet Ukraine and retained the annexed western Ukrainian lands. (*See also* Russian Civil War; Russo-Polish War.)

b. Soviet Ukraine

The territories under Bolshevik control were formally organized as the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic [S.S.R.] from 1937). Under Bolshevik tutelage, the first All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets in December 1917 had formed a Soviet government for Ukraine; the second, in March 1918, had declared Soviet Ukraine independent; and the third, in March 1919, had adopted Soviet Ukraine's first constitution. These moves, however, were essentially a tactical response to the demonstrable challenge of rising Ukrainian nationalism. With the consolidation of Bolshevik rule, Soviet Ukraine progressively ceded to Russia its rights in such areas as foreign relations and foreign trade. On December 30, 1922, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.)—a federation of Russia, Ukraine, Belorussia, and the Transcaucasian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (S.F.S.R.)—was proclaimed. The first constitution for the new multinational federation was ratified in January 1924. Although the constituent republics retained the formal right of secession, their jurisdiction was limited to domestic affairs, while authority over foreign relations, the military, commerce, and transportation was vested in the Communist Party organs in Moscow. In point of fact, after the defeat of the Bolsheviks' opponents, paramount power was exercised over all levels of government, as over the military and the secret police, by the Bolsheviks and their Communist Party apparatus (*see* Communist Party of the Soviet Union [CPSU]).

The Communist Party itself brooked no concessions to the principles of independence or federalism and remained a highly centralized entity. Thus, at its founding congress in Moscow in July 1918, the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine, or CP(B)U, proclaimed itself to be an integral part of a single Russian (after 1924, All-Union) Communist Party and subordinated to its congresses and central committee, despite the efforts of such national-minded Bolsheviks as Mykola Skrypnyk to declare the CP(B)U an independent organization. As well as being subordinate to Moscow, the CP(B)U was overwhelmingly non-Ukrainian in ethnic composition: at the time of its founding, the membership of fewer than 5,000 was 7 percent Ukrainian. The Ukrainian component in the CP(B)U was strengthened in 1920 with the accession of the Borotbists, members of the "independist" and non-Bolshevik Ukrainian Communist Party that was formed in 1919. Still, in late 1920, Ukrainians constituted less than 20 percent of the CP(B)U's membership. Largely alien in nationality and ideologically prepossessed in favour of the proletariat, the Bolsheviks enjoyed scant support in a population that was 80 percent Ukrainian, of which more than 90 percent were peasants.

c. The New Economic Policy and Ukrainization

Two main tasks faced the Bolsheviks in the 1920s—to rebuild the economy and to conciliate the non-Russian nationalities. The policy of War Communism—based on nationalization of all enterprises and the forcible requisition of food—wreaked economic havoc. Compounded by drought, it contributed to a famine in 1921–22 that claimed a million lives in Ukraine. In 1921 Soviet leader Vladimir Lenin introduced the New Economic Policy (NEP), which partially restored private enterprise in industry and trade and replaced grain requisitions with a fixed tax and the right to dispose of the surplus on the free market. By 1927 the Ukrainian economy recovered to the prewar level, and segments of the population enjoyed a measure of prosperity.

In parallel with the NEP, the Bolsheviks took steps to appease, and at the same time to penetrate, the non-Russian nationalities. In 1923 a policy of "indigenization" was announced, including the promotion of native languages in education and publishing, at the workplace, and in government; the fostering of national cultures; and the recruitment of cadres from the indigenous populations. In Ukraine this program inaugurated a decade of rapid Ukrainization and cultural efflorescence. Within the CP(B)U itself, the proportion of Ukrainians in the rank-and-file membership exceeded 50 percent by the late 1920s. Enrollments in Ukrainian-language schools and the publication of Ukrainian books increased dramatically. Lively debates developed about the course of Ukrainian literature, in which the writer Mykola Khvylovy employed the slogan "Away from Moscow!" and urged a cultural orientation toward Europe. An important factor in the national revival, despite antireligious propaganda and harassment, was the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, which had gained a wide following among the Ukrainian intelligentsia and peasantry since its formation in 1921.

Ukrainization was vigorously promoted by the "national communists," including such Ukrainian Bolsheviks as Skrypnyk and Khvylovy, and especially by the former Borotbists, most prominently the people's commissar of education, Oleksander Shumsky. The policy, however, encountered strong resistance from the non-Ukrainian leaders of the CP(B)U and party functionaries. The national revival also aroused concern in Moscow, where Joseph Stalin was strengthening his grip over the party apparatus. In 1925 Stalin dispatched his trusted lieutenant Lazar Kaganovich to head the CP(B)U. Within a year, Kaganovich engineered a split among the "national communists," Khvylovy's recantation, and the expulsion of Shumsky and his followers from the party. Nevertheless, with Skrypnyk as the new commissar of education, Ukrainization continued to advance.

d. Industrialization and collectivization

By the end of the 1920s, Stalin had launched a new "revolution from above." The introduction of his first five-year plan in 1928 marked the end of the NEP and the onset of breakneck industrialization. In Ukraine this led to rapid economic and social transformation. By the outbreak of World War II, industrial output had increased fourfold, the number of workers had tripled, and the urban population had grown from 19 to 34 percent of the total. Though with a sectoral bias toward heavy industry and a regional concentration in the Donets Basin (Donbas) and central Dnieper area, Ukraine had undergone a remarkable industrial development.

The cost of the accelerated industrialization was borne by the peasantry. In 1928 the regime introduced special measures against the kulaks (arbitrarily defined "wealthy" peasants).

These progressed from escalating taxes and grain-delivery quotas to dispossession of all property and finally to the deportation, by the mid-1930s, of some 100,000 families to Siberia and Kazakhstan. Wholesale collectivization began in 1929, under duress from party activists and under threat of economic sanctions. The percentage of farms collectivized rose from 9 to 65 percent from October 1929 to March 1930 and exceeded 90 percent by the end of 1935. Mass resistance to collectivization—in the form of revolts, slaughter of cattle, and destruction of machinery—was answered by the imposition of ever higher delivery quotas and confiscation of foodstuffs.

e. Holodomor

The result of Stalin's policies was the Great Famine (Holodomor) of 1932–33—a man-made demographic catastrophe unprecedented in peacetime. Of the estimated five million people who died in the Soviet Union, almost four million were Ukrainians. The famine was a direct assault on the Ukrainian peasantry, which had stubbornly continued to resist collectivization; indirectly, it was an attack on the Ukrainian village, which traditionally had been a key element of Ukrainian national culture. Its deliberate nature is underscored by the fact that no physical basis for famine existed in Ukraine. The Ukrainian grain harvest of 1932 had resulted in below-average yields (in part because of the chaos wreaked by the collectivization campaign), but it was more than sufficient to sustain the population. Nevertheless, Soviet authorities set requisition quotas for Ukraine at an impossibly high level. Brigades of special agents were dispatched to Ukraine to assist in procurement, and homes were routinely searched and foodstuffs confiscated. At the same time, a law was passed in August 1932 making the theft of socialist property a capital crime, leading to scenes in which peasants faced the firing squad for stealing as little as a sack of wheat from state storehouses. The rural population was left with insufficient food to feed itself. The ensuing starvation grew to a massive scale by the spring of 1933, but Moscow refused to provide relief. In fact, the Soviet Union exported more than a million tons of grain to the West during this period.

The famine subsided only after the 1933 harvest had been completed. The traditional Ukrainian village had been essentially destroyed, and settlers from Russia were brought in to repopulate the devastated countryside. Soviet authorities flatly denied the existence of the famine both at the time it was raging and after it was over. It was only in the late 1980s that officials made a guarded acknowledgement that something had been amiss in Ukraine at this time.

f. Western Ukraine Under Soviet and Nazi Rule

The Nazi German invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939, marked the beginning of World War II. By mid-September, in accordance with the secret protocols of the German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact (Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact), western Volhynia and most of Galicia, both previously under Polish rule, were occupied by Soviet troops and soon officially incorporated into the Ukrainian S.S.R. In June 1940 northern Bukovina was occupied and shortly annexed to Soviet Ukraine from Romania (which sided with Germany during the war). The replacement of Polish and Romanian by the Ukrainian language in state administration and education was offset by a suppression of all existing organizations, Sovietization of institutional life, and arrests of political leaders and community activists.

By mid-1941 more than one million people had been deported to the east, including large numbers of Poles and Jews.

The ethnically mixed western borderlands, with more than 500,000 Ukrainians, were included in the administrative region of Poland established by the Nazis. A limited linguistic and cultural revival in the heavily Polonized area was permitted under German oversight, but political activities were banned, except for the OUN. The OUN itself was rent by factional strife between the followers of Andry Melnyk, who headed the organization from abroad after the assassination of Konovalets by a Soviet agent in 1938, and the younger supporters of Stepan Bandera with actual experience in the conspiratorial underground. The split became permanent after a congress held in Kraków in February 1940, when the Melnyk and Bandera factions developed into separate organizations (OUN-M and OUN-B, respectively) differing in ideology, strategy, and tactics.

g. The Nazi Occupation of Soviet Ukraine

The surprise German invasion of the U.S.S.R. began on June 22, 1941. The Soviets, during their hasty retreat, shot their political prisoners and, whenever possible, evacuated personnel, dismantled and removed industrial plants, and conducted a scorched-earth policy—blowing up buildings and installations, destroying crops and food reserves, and flooding mines. Almost four million people were evacuated east of the Urals for the duration of the war. The Germans moved swiftly, however, and by the end of November virtually all of Ukraine was under their control. Initially, the Germans were greeted as liberators by some of the Ukrainian populace. In Galicia especially, there had long been a widespread belief that Germany, as the avowed enemy of Poland and the U.S.S.R., was the Ukrainians' natural ally for the attainment of their independence. The illusion was quickly shattered. The Germans were accompanied on their entry into Lviv on June 30 by members of OUN-B, who that same day proclaimed the restoration of Ukrainian statehood and the formation of a provisional state administration; within days the organizers of this action were arrested and interned in concentration camps (as were both Bandera and, later, Melnyk). Far from supporting Ukrainian political aspirations, the Nazis in August attached Galicia administratively to Poland, returned Bukovina to Romania, and gave Romania control over the area between the Dniester and Southern Buh rivers as the province of Transnistria, with its capital at Odessa. The remainder was organized as the Reichskommissariat Ukraine.

In the occupied territories, the Nazis sought to implement their "racial" policies. In the fall of 1941 began the mass killings of Jews that continued through 1944. An estimated 1.5 million Ukrainian Jews perished, and over 800,000 were displaced to the east; at Baby Yar (Ukrainian: Babyn Yar) in Kyiv, nearly 34,000 were killed in just the first two days of massacre in the city. The Nazis were aided at times by auxiliary forces recruited from the local population.

In the Reichskommissariat, ruthlessly administered by Erich Koch, Ukrainians were slated for servitude. The collective farms, whose dissolution was the fervent hope of the peasantry, were left intact, industry was allowed to deteriorate, and the cities were deprived of foodstuffs as all available resources were directed to support the German war effort. Some 2.2 million people were taken from Ukraine to Germany as slave labourers (Ostarbeiter, or

“eastern workers”). Cultural activities were repressed, and education was limited to the elementary level. Only the revived Ukrainian Orthodox Church was permitted to resume its work as a national institution. Somewhat better was the situation of Ukrainians in Galicia, where restricted cultural, civic, and relief activities were permitted under centralized control.

Under such conditions of brutality, Ukrainian political activity, predicated originally on cooperation with the Germans, increasingly turned to underground organizational work and resistance. The OUN groups that streamed eastward in 1941 were soon subjected by the German authorities to repressive measures, including execution, so they propagated their nationalist views clandestinely and, through their contact with the local population, began to revise their ideology in a more democratic, pluralist direction. In eastern and central Ukraine, secret Communist Party cells maintained an underground existence, and a Soviet partisan movement developed in the northern forests. Early in 1942 began the formation of nationalist partisan units in Volhynia, and later in Galicia, that became known as the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (Ukrainska Povstanska Armiia; UPA). As well as conducting guerrilla warfare with the Germans, the Soviet partisans and the UPA fought each other.

h. Ukraine Reunited Under Soviet Rule

After their victory over the Germans at the Battle of Stalingrad in early 1943, the Soviets launched a counteroffensive westward. In mid-1943 the Germans began their slow retreat from Ukraine, leaving wholesale destruction in their wake. In November the Soviets reentered Kyiv. With the approach of the front, guerrilla activity in western Ukraine intensified, and bloody clashes that claimed large numbers of civilian victims occurred between Ukrainians and Poles. In spring 1944 the Red Army began to penetrate into Galicia, and by the end of October all of Ukraine was again under Soviet control.

The Soviet victory, the Red Army’s occupation of eastern Europe, and Allied diplomacy resulted in a permanent redrawing of Ukraine’s western frontiers. With compensation of German territories in the west, Poland agreed to the cession of Volhynia and Galicia; a mutual population exchange—and the subsequent deportation of the remaining Ukrainian population by Poland to its new western territories—created for the first time in centuries a clear ethnic, as well as political, Polish-Ukrainian border. Northern Bukovina was reoccupied in 1944 and recognized as part of Ukraine in the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947. Transcarpathia, which had reverted from Hungary to Czechoslovakia in 1944, was ceded to Ukraine in 1945 by a Czech-Soviet government agreement. In 1945 Ukraine became a charter member of the United Nations and subsequently became a signatory of peace treaties with Germany’s wartime allies—Italy, Finland, Romania, Hungary, and Bulgaria.

Ukraine’s human and material losses during World War II were enormous. Some 5 to 7 million people perished. Even with the return of evacuees from the east and the repatriation of forced labourers from Germany, Ukraine’s estimated population of 36 million in 1947 was almost 5 million less than before the war. Because more than 700 cities and towns and 28,000 villages had been destroyed, 10 million people were left homeless. Only 20 percent of the industrial enterprises and 15 percent of agricultural equipment and machinery remained intact, and the transportation network was severely damaged. The material losses constituted an estimated 40 percent of Ukraine’s national wealth.

i. Ukraine on the Path of Independence

An upsurge of nationalism was the unexpected and unintended consequence of Gorbachev's attempt to grapple with the Soviet Union's mounting economic problems. Beginning in 1986, Gorbachev launched a campaign for an ill-defined economic *perestroika* ("restructuring") and called for an honest confrontation with real problems, or *glasnost* ("openness"), which further entailed popular involvement in the process. In the non-Russian republics, these policies opened the opportunity to voice not merely economic but also predominantly national concerns.

In contrast to the rapid growth of mass movements in the Baltic and Transcaucasian republics, in Ukraine the national revival stimulated by glasnost developed only gradually. From mid-1986 the Ukrainian press and media, at first cautiously, began to broach long-forbidden topics. While this process expanded and intensified, the spontaneous formation locally of unofficial groups, primarily in Kyiv and Lviv, began in 1987. The year 1988 witnessed the rise of mass mobilization, with the first public demonstrations—in Lviv from June through August and in Kyiv in November—and the emergence of embryonic national organizations. Finally, the national revival in Ukraine entered the stage of overt politicization in 1989.

In the three years 1987–89, new leaders emerged. Especially prominent were many cultural activists from the *shestydesyatnyky* of the Shelest period, as well as former dissidents. The issues that galvanized Ukrainian society at this time included such traditional concerns as language, culture, and history, resurgent interests such as religion, and new concerns over the environment and the economy.

Russification and the parlous state of the Ukrainian language in schools, publishing, and state administration received the earliest attention. Fears about the long-term language trends were confirmed by data from the 1989 census: at the same time that Ukrainians had declined as a percentage of Ukraine's population, their attachment to Ukrainian as their native language had fallen even more rapidly. Debates over the issue culminated in the passage of a language law in autumn 1989 that for the first time gave Ukrainian official status as the republic's state language.

A campaign to fill in the "blank spots" in history aimed to restore public awareness of neglected or suppressed historical events and figures such as Hetman Ivan Mazepa, to rehabilitate historians such as Mykhaylo Hrushevsky, and to republish banned works of pre-Soviet historical scholarship. Particularly intense were efforts to introduce knowledge of the Stalin period, especially the Great Famine of 1932–33, which became labeled the "Ukrainian genocide." Fresh revelations appeared in the press about mass graves of political prisoners executed in the Stalin era. To honour the victims of Stalinism and to promote investigations of the repressions and famine of the 1930s, the All-Ukrainian "Memorial" Society was founded in March 1989 based on already existing local groups.

A religious revival was also under way in 1988, greatly stimulated by celebrations of a millennium of Christianity in Kyivan (Kievan) Rus. Lavish government-supported Russian Orthodox solemnities in Moscow were countered with unofficial celebrations throughout Ukraine, including open observances by the proscribed Greek Catholics. As bishops and clergy emerged from the underground, demands grew for the relegalization of the Ukrainian

Greek Catholic Church. Defections by the clergy and entire congregations from Russian Orthodoxy began in the fall of 1989, and, on the eve of Gorbachev's visit to the Vatican in December, Soviet authorities announced that Greek Catholic communities would be allowed official registration. In a parallel development, the formation of an initiative group for the restoration of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church was proclaimed in February 1989 in Kyiv.

Continuing revelations about the scale of the Chernobyl catastrophe and mounting evidence of official wrongdoing in its aftermath, combined with fresh disclosures about other disasters and the environmental ruination of Ukraine, engendered a widespread ecological movement. On the initiative of scientists and writers, environmental groups were formed in virtually every region, and in December 1987 they joined in a national association, Zeleny Svit ("Green World"). In the course of 1989, Zeleny Svit evolved into a potent political force led by the writer Yury Shcherbak.

The traditionally passive industrial workers in Ukraine also became organized, especially in the Donbas. Years of neglect by Moscow resulted in steady deterioration of the coal-mining industry and increasingly hazardous working conditions in the mines. Complaints in the form of letters by miners began to appear as early as 1985. But it was only in July 1989 that a spontaneous movement of self-organization by Donbas miners led to a strike. Concessions extended by Moscow were insufficient to stem the growing alienation. In the course of the year, the overwhelmingly Russian-speaking miners, with concerns far removed from those of the Ukrainian cultural intelligentsia, began to be drawn to the Ukrainian national movement as a defender of their interests in confrontation with Moscow.
The first significant organization with an overtly political agenda was launched in March 1988. This was the Ukrainian Helsinki Union, formed by recently released political prisoners, many of whom had been members of the Helsinki Watch Group of the mid-1970s. The Helsinki Union's declared aim was the restoration of Ukraine's sovereignty as the main guarantee of its population's national and human rights and the transformation of the U.S.S.R. into a genuine confederation of states. Headed by Levko Lukyanenko, with Vyacheslav Chornovil as an important leader, the Ukrainian Helsinki Union had branches in all regions of Ukraine by 1989.

At all stages, the process of national revival and autonomous self-organization encountered bitter resistance from the CPU, which under Shcherbytsky remained among the most unreconstructed of the U.S.S.R.'s republican Communist Party organizations. Opposition to the rising democratic forces took the form of propaganda attacks in the press and media, intimidation, harassment, and occasional arrests. Shcherbytsky himself continued firmly in charge of the CPU, in a sign of Moscow's fear of destabilization in Ukraine. Nevertheless, the official policies of perestroika and glasnost inhibited more-extreme measures, while the example of rapid change in other republics, especially the Baltics, emboldened democratic Ukrainian activists.

j. Parliamentary Democracy

The year 1989 marked the transition from social mobilization to mass politicization of life in Ukraine. Elections to a new supreme legislative body in Moscow, the Congress of People's Deputies, brought victory to a significant number of noncommunist candidates.

Numerous Communist Party candidates, including highly placed officials, suffered defeat, all the more humiliating in those cases when they ran unopposed. (In these cases, voters crossed off the single name on the ballot; if an unopposed candidate failed to capture more than 50 percent of the vote, the election was declared void and the candidate was barred from running in subsequent races.) The party's confidence was shaken, and resignations began to rise significantly.

Attempts to organize a popular front received impetus in January 1989 under the aegis of the Writers' Union of Ukraine. Taking the name Narodnyi Rukh Ukrainy ("Popular Movement of Ukraine for Reconstruction," often shortened to Rukh), to emphasize its congruence with the policies of Gorbachev (particularly perestroika), the front nevertheless ran into hostility from the CPU. Specifically eschewing the role of a political opposition, Rukh advocated a program of democratization and support for human, national, and minority rights. The founding congress was held in September and elected a leadership headed by the poet Ivan Drach.

On September 28, 1989, Shcherbytsky, long rumoured to be ill, resigned as first secretary of the CPU. His successor, Volodymyr Ivashko, while praising his predecessor and reaffirming the CPU's basic policy line, made the first cautious references to new political realities and the need for the Communist Party to take these into account. These realities included a rapid institutionalization of national, civic, and religious life that outpaced legal recognition.

The most significant development of 1990 was the beginning of parliamentary democracy. The first competitive elections to the Ukrainian parliament (which replaced the old-style Supreme Soviet), held on March 4, broke the Communist Party's monopoly on political power in Ukraine. The parliament that met in mid-May had a substantial democratic bloc that, with the defection of numerous communist deputies from strict party discipline on particular issues, reduced the CPU's core majority to 239 of the 450 members. Changes in the political leadership proceeded rapidly and culminated in the parliament's election of the recent CPU secretary for ideology, Leonid Kravchuk, as its chairman. On July 16 sovereignty (though not yet independence) was claimed in the name of the "people of Ukraine"—the entirety of Ukraine's resident population without regard to nationality or ethnicity; the declaration marked the onset of a gradual convergence of views on key issues between the communist majority and the democratic opposition, whose agenda was increasingly adopted by the pragmatic Kravchuk.

Gorbachev, faced with a rising tide of nationalism, had already proposed a renegotiated new union treaty that would extend broad autonomy to the Soviet republics while preserving central control of foreign policy, the military, and the financial system. To forestall the cession of newly asserted sovereign rights to Moscow, student-led mass demonstrations and a hunger strike were held in Kyiv in October 1990; the protests extracted concessions that included the resignation of the premier. In the same month, Rukh, whose membership was growing rapidly, proclaimed as its ultimate goal the total independence of Ukraine. Only the CPU declared its support for Gorbachev's plans of a new union treaty.

A coup d'état organized in August 1991 by hard-line members of Gorbachev's government in Moscow collapsed within two days. In its wake the Ukrainian parliament, in emergency session, declared the full independence of Ukraine on August 24. The declaration was made subject to popular ratification by a referendum on December 1.

The population of Ukraine voted overwhelmingly for independence in the referendum of December 1, 1991. (About 84 percent of eligible voters turned out for the referendum, and about 90 percent of them endorsed independence.) In an election coinciding with the referendum, Kravchuk was chosen as president. By this time, several important developments had taken place in Ukraine, including the dissolution of the Communist Party and the development (under the newly appointed Minister of Defense Kostiantyn Morozov) of the infrastructure for separate Ukrainian armed forces. Ukraine also had withstood political pressure from Moscow to reconsider its course toward independence and enter into a restructured Soviet Union. A week after the independence referendum, the leaders of Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus agreed to establish the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Shortly thereafter the U.S.S.R. was formally disbanded.

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Ukraine was commonly regarded as the former Soviet republic (outside of those in the Baltic region) with the best chance of achieving economic prosperity and integration with Europe as a whole. But by the end of the 20th century, the Ukrainian economy had faltered badly, and social and political change fell short of transforming Ukraine into a wholly European state. Nevertheless, Ukraine registered some important gains in this period. It consolidated its independence and developed its state structure, regularized relations with neighbouring countries (in spite of some contentious issues), made some important steps in the process of democratization, and established itself as a member in good standing of the international community.

k. State Building and Diplomacy in Independent Ukraine

President Kravchuk's immediate priority was state building. Under his stewardship, Ukraine quickly established its armed forces and the infrastructure of an independent state. Citizenship was extended to the people of Ukraine on an inclusive (rather than ethnic or linguistic) basis. Ukraine received widespread international recognition and developed its diplomatic service. A pro-Western foreign policy was instituted, and official pronouncements stressed that Ukraine was a "European" rather than a "Eurasian" country. The state symbols and national anthem of the post-World War I Ukrainian National Republic were reinstituted. Yet at the same time that independent Ukraine was acquiring the attributes of statehood, it faced a number of contentious issues that severely strained the fledgling country: the nature of its participation in the CIS, nuclear disarmament, the status of Crimea, and control of the Black Sea Fleet and its port city of Sevastopol. While inflaming passions on both sides of the border, these issues also helped to define Ukraine's new relationship with Russia.

Ukrainian leaders perceived the CIS to be no more than a loose association of former Soviet republics and a means of assisting in a "civilized divorce" from the union. In contrast, Russia regarded it as a means of retaining some degree of regional integration (under Moscow's political domination) and sought to establish it as a supranational body that would succeed the U.S.S.R. These differing views were not clear at the meeting that created the CIS, but within several weeks they had become very evident. Disagreements between Russia and Ukraine ensued as the latter repudiated proposals for a CIS army under unified command, a common CIS citizenship, and the guarding of "external" rather than national borders. Remaining vigilant that involvement with the CIS not compromise its sovereignty, Ukraine participated only as an associate member. However, after more than seven years of

independence, with the CIS no longer a real threat to the country's sovereignty, Ukraine finally agreed to join the CIS Interparliamentary Assembly in March 1999.

The issue of nuclear disarmament proved a vexing one. In the wake of the Chernobyl disaster, antinuclear popular sentiment ran high in Ukraine; even prior to independence, Ukrainian leaders had committed themselves to divesting the country of nuclear weapons. But throughout this period, Ukrainians had not been aware of the size of the nuclear arsenal on their soil—Ukraine was effectively the third largest nuclear power in the world at the time—nor had they considered the high costs and logistical problems of nuclear divestment. After approximately half of the arsenal had been transferred to Russia early in 1992, the leaders of independent Ukraine began to question the wisdom of blindly handing over the weapons to a potential adversary that was now claiming portions of Ukraine's territory (i.e., Crimea). Ukraine then expressed reservations about the complete removal of the weapons from the country before it could obtain some guarantees for its security as well as financial compensation for the dismantling and transportation of the warheads. This apparent backtracking caused major concern in the West (particularly in the United States) and Russia. Intense diplomatic pressure followed, and Ukraine began to be portrayed as something of a rogue state in the Western media. Finally, in May 1992 Ukraine signed the Lisbon Protocol, which marked Ukraine's accession to the START I treaty (*see* Strategic Arms Reduction Talks). Subsequent negotiations, brokered by the United States, resulted in a trilateral statement (between the United States, Russia, and Ukraine) in January 1994, which outlined a timetable for disarmament and dealt with the financial and security issues that Ukraine had raised.

The interconnected issues of Crimea, Sevastopol, and the Black Sea Fleet not only constituted Ukraine's thorniest postindependence problem but also posed a significant threat to peace in the region. In 1954 the Russian S.F.S.R. had transferred the administration of Crimea to the Ukrainian S.S.R. However, it was the one region of Ukraine where ethnic Russians constituted a majority of the population. In 1991 Crimea was granted the status of an autonomous republic, and Crimeans supported the vote for Ukrainian independence (albeit by a small majority). But disenchantment with an independent Ukraine soon followed, and a movement for greater autonomy or even secession developed in the peninsula. The separatists were encouraged in their efforts by routine pronouncements by prominent Russian politicians and the Russian Duma that Crimea was Russian territory that never should have been part of Ukraine. The situation was complicated by the arrival of about 250,000 Crimean Tatars in the peninsula—returning to the historic homeland from which they had been deported at the end of World War II—starting in the late 1980s.

Tensions in the region increased in 1994: separatist leader Yury Meshkov was elected Crimean president in January, and a referendum calling for sovereignty was passed two months later. Meshkov proved to be an inept leader, however, and he quickly alienated his own supporters. By September he and the Crimean parliament were locked in a constitutional struggle. The parliament finally stripped Meshkov of his powers and elected a pro-Kyiv prime minister. In March 1995 Ukraine abolished the post of Crimean president and instituted direct political rule, though it granted Crimea significant economic concessions. The Crimean separatist movement collapsed.

The dispute between Russia and Ukraine over control of the Black Sea Fleet and Sevastopol, the Crimean port city where the fleet was based, was particularly acrimonious. Early in 1992 Ukraine laid claim to the entire fleet, which had been an important naval asset of the Soviet Union. Russia responded unequivocally that the fleet always had been and would remain Russia's. A "war of decrees" over the issue continued until June 1992, when Kravchuk and Russian Pres. Boris Yeltsin agreed that the fleet would be administered jointly for a three-year period. Subsequently an agreement was reached to divide the fleet's assets evenly, but after further negotiation Ukraine consented to allow Russia to acquire a majority share of the fleet in exchange for debt forgiveness. The question of basing rights was not resolved until a final agreement on the Black Sea Fleet was reached in 1997. It allowed Russia to lease the main port facilities of Sevastopol for 20 years. Shortly afterward, Ukraine and Russia signed the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership (1997), which recognized Ukraine's territorial sovereignty and existing borders (including Crimea) and regularized relations to some degree.

The turbulent relations between Ukraine and Russia in the post-Soviet period were likely inevitable, given that the independence of Ukraine was such a sudden, fundamental change. Russia had tremendous difficulty in perceiving—let alone accepting—Ukraine as an independent country: it viewed Ukraine as an integral part of the Russian realm and even considered Ukrainians to be virtually the same people as Russians. Consequently, Russia reacted to Ukraine's departure more strongly than it did to the separation of the other Soviet republics. On the other hand, Ukraine was intensely aware of the fragility of its recent independence and extremely sensitive to any perceived encroachment on its sovereignty by Russia. Relations between the two countries continued to be volatile into the early 21st century. Ukraine's dependence on Russia for fossil fuels was an issue of particular concern. For example, in 2006 Russia temporarily cut off its supply of natural gas to Ukraine after claiming that Ukraine had not paid its bills. Ukraine, however, maintained that the move was a reprisal for its pro-Western policies.

Ukraine's relations with its other neighbours tended to be much more cordial. Relations with Hungary were from the outset friendly. Poland was supportive of Ukrainian independence as well, notwithstanding earlier centuries of acrimony. Ukraine also fostered a working relationship with several countries of the former Soviet Union by cofounding a loose subregional organization called GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova; known as GUAM from 1999 to 2005, when Uzbekistan was a member). Relations with Romania were complicated by that country's claims to certain Ukrainian territories, including northern Bukovina and southern Bessarabia, as well as Zmiyinyy (Serpent) Island and its surrounding waters in the Black Sea. Belarus's authoritarian political system and its proposed two-state union with Russia rendered close ties with Ukraine unlikely.

Ukraine's relations with the United States started out very poorly. During a visit to Ukraine in the summer of 1991, U.S. Pres. George Bush affronted many Ukrainians when he warned them against "suicidal" nationalism and urged them to remain within the U.S.S.R. When Ukraine gained independence later that year, Washington was extremely concerned about the new country's large nuclear arsenal. Only after the resolution of the disarmament issue did significant ties begin to develop. Ukraine soon ranked as a major recipient of U.S. foreign assistance, and the two countries developed a strong political relationship.

l. Economic Difficulties

Ukraine's post independence economic performance—in sharp contrast to its relatively successful efforts at state building and diplomacy—was markedly poor. The social dislocation brought about by economic "shock therapy" in Russia dampened the Ukrainian government's desire for rapid change; it opted instead for a gradualist approach toward achieving a mixed economy. Economic decline followed, since Ukrainian industry was already suffering from the disruption of trade with former Soviet republics in the wake of the U.S.S.R.'s demise. Ukraine's heavy dependence on foreign energy sources also strained the economy, particularly because Russia, Ukraine's main supplier, moved to raise the previously subsidized price of fossil fuels to world levels. As a solid monetary policy had not been established, Ukraine experienced hyperinflation, which reached a rate of at least 4,735 percent in 1993. Meanwhile, corruption increased as political insiders grabbed state assets for themselves or took unfair advantage of low-interest loans available to industry and agriculture. A sustained attempt at economic reform came with the appointment of Leonid Kuchma as prime minister in October 1992. His efforts, however, were strongly opposed by a majority of parliamentarians and, to a degree, undermined by President Kravchuk himself. An exasperated Kuchma resigned in 1993.

m. Social Developments

Post Independence society in Ukraine saw some positive developments. The media became much more open and vibrant, although those who were too openly critical of the administration were subject to harassment, notably during Kuchma's presidency (1994–2005). Previous constraints on academic and intellectual life were lifted, resulting in a growing and diverse body of publications, and liberal arts and business schools began to emerge. There was substantial development in religious life, as the Ukrainian Orthodox and Ukrainian Catholic churches—as well as other denominations—were able to operate freely. In addition, a new generation of youth began to grow up without the ideological and intellectual constraints of Soviet society.,

Relations with minority groups in the post independence period were generally peaceful. The Jewish community experienced something of a renaissance, with the American-born chief rabbi of Kyiv, Yaakov Dov Bleich, playing an instrumental role in organizing synagogues, schools, and charitable activities. Moreover, the Ukrainian government openly pursued a positive relationship with the Jewish community. The Hungarians and Romanians in western Ukraine were afforded nationality rights, and the government made some efforts to assist the Tatars, tens of thousands of whom still resided abroad as a result of mass deportations in the 1940s. Unrest among the Tatars was limited in the post independence period, in large measure because of the effective leadership of former dissident Mustafa Jemilev.

Ukraine's large Russian minority found itself in an ambiguous situation in the post independence years. As part of the dominant nationality within the U.S.S.R., it had maintained the preferred status of what some observers termed a "psychological majority" in Soviet Ukraine. In independent Ukraine, however, the status of Russians was less assured. Although granting Ukrainian Russians the full rights of citizenship was never an issue, many of them were frustrated that Russian was not recognized as the second official

language of the country. This highly contentious matter was resolved to some degree in 2012, when a new law was passed that allowed regional authorities to confer official status upon minority languages. Moreover, the gradual Ukrainization of the school system has not been popular in regions of Ukraine with large Russian populations. The matter was further complicated by Russia's vow to defend the rights of ethnic Russians in the so-called "near-abroad," which includes Ukraine.

Post independence Ukraine witnessed the growth of numerous social ills. Both street crime and organized crime increased, and Ukraine became a conduit for the international illegal drug trade. A rise in the number of drug addicts accompanied a worrisome growth in the number of people infected with HIV. The trafficking of Ukrainian women for the international sex trade also emerged as a serious concern—evidenced by the fact that Ukraine was the first former Soviet republic to host an office of La Strada International (a network of organizations that work to prevent human trafficking). Life expectancy fell, particularly for males, and occurrences of diseases considered long eradicated, such as cholera, were recorded. Many people—especially the elderly—were reduced to living in dire poverty, and many others sought work outside Ukraine, both legally and illegally, as migrant labourers.

VII. *PRESIDENCY of UKRAINE*

a. Kuchma's Presidency

Parliamentary and presidential elections were held in Ukraine in 1994. In the first contest, candidates affiliated with the revived Communist Party emerged as the largest single group, winning approximately one-fifth of the seats. Factoring in the deputies of the Socialist and Agrarian parties, the latter of which drew its support from rural interests and farmers, the left now constituted a strong—although not united—bloc in the new parliament. In the presidential election the incumbent president, Kravchuk, was narrowly defeated by former prime minister Kuchma, who promised economic reform and better relations with Russia. The two contests seemed to reveal a political polarization between eastern and western Ukraine. Kuchma and the left received their greatest support from the more heavily industrialized and Russophone regions of eastern Ukraine, whereas Kravchuk did particularly well in western Ukraine, where Ukrainian speakers and national democrats predominated. Nevertheless, the minimal number of irregularities in the elections and the peaceful replacement of the president were widely interpreted as signs that democracy was taking root in Ukraine.

Once in office, Kuchma maintained many of his predecessor's policies. Significantly, while seeking more cordial relations with Moscow, he did not reorient Ukraine's foreign policy northward. Ukraine continued to participate in the CIS but in much the same manner as it had previously. Moreover, Kuchma maintained Ukraine's pro-Western policies and aspirations. In 1994 Ukraine joined the Partnership for Peace Programme run by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); the country also established a "special partnership" with the organization in 1996. In 1995 Ukraine joined the Council of Europe.

Kuchma faced a major challenge in dealing with a strong parliamentary opposition, particularly in respect to economic reform. Ukraine managed to achieve macroeconomic stabilization by 1996, the year in which it introduced its long-awaited currency, the hryvnya. However, the economy continued to perform poorly through the end of the decade.

Cumbersome bureaucratic procedures and unenforced economic legislation led business to be both overregulated and rife with corruption. In addition, the country was able to attract only a limited amount of foreign investment. The Russian economic crisis of 1998 negatively affected Ukraine's economy as well. But in 1999 the introduction of tax-reform measures saw a growth in the number of small private businesses established or emerging from the country's significant shadow economy. At the turn of the 21st century the legitimate economy began to grow.

In the 1998 parliamentary elections the Communist Party actually improved its showing. In the 1999 presidential election, however, Kuchma defeated Communist Party leader Petro Symonenko by a resounding margin. Politically, Kuchma had benefited from the splintering of the left among several candidates. He also had campaigned vigorously, using all the means available to him, particularly the media. Indeed, a strong bias in favour of Kuchma became evident in the television coverage of the election. International observers were critical of Kuchma's handling of the media and some obvious electoral irregularities. His margin of victory, however, indicated that these factors alone had not determined the outcome of the vote.

The result of the 1999 election was significant in two respects. First, it represented a rejection of the communist past. Some observers remarked that it even constituted a second referendum on independence. Second, the vote did not split neatly along geographical lines, indicating that—for that moment at least—the east-west divide seen in the 1994 elections was not as important a factor in Ukrainian politics as many analysts had suggested.

During Kuchma's second term, conflicts between right- and left-wing forces sometimes threatened political stability. Nevertheless, newly appointed prime minister Viktor Yushchenko shepherded economic reforms through the legislature. The economy grew steadily in the first years of the 21st century, but the political situation remained tense in Ukraine as it sought membership in NATO and the European Union (EU) while also pursuing closer relations with Russia—a delicate balancing act. In 2003 Ukraine accepted in principle a proposal to establish a "joint economic space" with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan; however, Ukrainian-Russian relations were strained by Russian accusations of deteriorating conditions for the Russian minority in Ukraine, along with Ukrainian concerns over what it viewed to be Russian expansionist designs in Crimea.

Yushchenko became an opposition leader following his dismissal as prime minister in 2001. The following year, audio tapes allegedly revealed Kuchma's approval of the sale of a radar system to Iraq, in violation of a United Nations Security Council resolution, and implicated him in the assassination of a dissident journalist in 2000. Opposition groups called for the impeachment of Kuchma, who denied the allegations.

b. Orange Revolution and Yushchenko's Presidency

The presidential election of 2004 brought Ukraine to the brink of disintegration and civil war. Cleared to seek a third term as president by the Constitutional Court, Kuchma instead endorsed the candidacy of Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych, who was also strongly supported by Russian Pres. Vladimir Putin. Yushchenko—running on an anti-corruption,

anti-cronyism platform—emerged as the leading opposition candidate, but his campaign was prevented from visiting Yanukovych's stronghold of Donetsk and other eastern cities. In September Yushchenko's health began to fail, and medical tests later revealed he had suffered dioxin poisoning (allegedly carried out by the Ukrainian State Security Service), which left his face disfigured. In the first round of the presidential election, on October 31, Yushchenko and Yanukovych both won about two-fifths of the vote. In the runoff the following month, Yanukovych was declared the winner, though Yushchenko's supporters charged fraud and staged mass protests that came to be known as the Orange Revolution. Protestors clad in orange, Yushchenko's campaign color, took to the streets, and the country endured nearly two weeks of demonstrations. Yanukovych's supporters in the east threatened to secede from Ukraine if the results were annulled. Nevertheless, on December 3 the Supreme Court ruled the election invalid and ordered a new runoff for December 26. Yushchenko subsequently defeated Yanukovych by garnering some 52 percent of the vote. Although Yanukovych challenged the validity of the results, Yushchenko was inaugurated on January 23, 2005.

Political turmoil occupied the first few years of Yushchenko's presidency. His first cabinet served only until September 2005, when he dismissed all his ministers, including Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko, a fellow leader of the Orange Revolution. The next prime minister, Yury Yekhanurov, stayed in office only until January 2006. Parliamentary elections early that year saw Yushchenko's Our Ukraine party finish third, behind Yanukovych's Party of Regions and the Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc. When a proposed coalition of the so-called Orange parties in the parliament fell apart, Yushchenko was forced to accept his rival Yanukovych as prime minister. The ensuing power struggle between the president and the prime minister, whose political role had been enhanced by a constitutional reform that took effect in 2006, led Yushchenko to call for another round of parliamentary elections in 2007. Once again the president's party finished behind both Yanukovych's and Tymoshenko's parties. This time, however, a coalition with the Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc held together, allowing the pro-Western Orange parties to form a government with Tymoshenko as prime minister. As the government continued to balance the often conflicting goals of maintaining positive relations with Russia and gaining membership in the EU, dissent between Yushchenko and Tymoshenko contributed to the collapse of their coalition in September 2008. In October the president dissolved parliament. Parliamentary elections, at first scheduled for December, later were canceled, and Yushchenko's and Tymoshenko's parties agreed to form a new coalition, together with the smaller Lytvyn Bloc, headed by Volodymyr Lytvyn.

c. Yanukovych's Presidency

The next presidential election, held on January 17, 2010, confirmed the political demise of President Yushchenko, who received only about 5 percent of the vote. The top two candidates, Yanukovych and Tymoshenko, garnered about 35 and 25 percent, respectively. Because neither had won a majority of votes, a runoff poll was held on February 7. The runoff results were split largely along regional lines, with most of western Ukraine supporting Tymoshenko and most of the east favouring Yanukovych. Winning 48.95 percent of the vote—a narrow lead over Tymoshenko's 45.47 percent—Yanukovych took the presidency. Although international observers determined that the poll had been fair, Tymoshenko declared the results fraudulent and refused to recognize Yanukovych's victory; she and her supporters boycotted the inauguration of Yanukovych on February 25. The

following week Tymoshenko's government was felled by a vote of no confidence and Mykola Azarov of the Party of Regions was installed as prime minister. President Yanukovych gained greater executive authority later in 2010 when the Constitutional Court overturned the 2006 reform that had enhanced the powers of the prime minister.

In April 2010, following a fractious parliamentary debate, Ukraine agreed to extend Russia's lease of the port at Sevastopol, originally set to expire in 2017, until 2042. In exchange, Ukraine would receive a reduction in the price of Russian natural gas. The Ukrainian government further improved relations with Russia in June 2010, when it officially abandoned its goal of joining NATO—a pursuit Russia had opposed. As the Yanukovych administration continued its pivot towards Moscow, EU leaders expressed concern about the preservation of the rule of law in Ukraine.

In 2011 former prime minister Tymoshenko, the country's most popular politician, was convicted of abuse of power in connection with a 2009 natural gas deal with Russia and given a seven-year prison sentence. In February 2012 Tymoshenko's interior minister, Yuri Lutsenko, also was convicted of abuse of power and sentenced to four years in prison. Many observers believed both trials were politically motivated. When Ukraine cohosted the UEFA European Championship football tournament in summer 2012, a number of EU countries registered their concern for Tymoshenko by boycotting the event.

In the parliamentary election in October 2012, the ruling Party of Regions emerged as the single largest bloc, with 185 seats. Tymoshenko's Fatherland party claimed 101 seats, Vitali Klitschko's Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reforms (UDAR) won 40 seats, and the ultranationalist Svoboda ("Freedom") party had a surprisingly strong showing, winning 37 seats. Challenging the validity of the results, Tymoshenko embarked on a hunger strike. Although international observers called attention to irregularities in some contests, the European Parliament characterized the election as comparatively fair, and the main opposition parties accepted the official results. In December 2012 sitting Prime Minister Azarov formed a government with the support of Communist and independent deputies. In what was widely seen as an attempt to thaw relations with the EU, Yanukovych pardoned the imprisoned Lutsenko and ordered his release in April 2013.

d. Euromaidan Protest

Ukraine's pro-European trajectory was abruptly halted in November 2013, when a planned association agreement with the EU was scuttled just days before it was scheduled to be signed. The accord would have more closely integrated political and economic ties between the EU and Ukraine, but Yanukovych bowed to intense pressure from Moscow. Street protests erupted in Kyiv, and Lutsenko and Klitschko emerged as the leaders of the largest demonstrations since the Orange Revolution. Police violently dispersed crowds in Kyiv's Maidan Nezalezhnosti ("Independence Square"), and, as the protests continued into December, demonstrators occupied Kyiv's city hall and called on Yanukovych to resign. Russia, in turn, offered to cut the price of natural gas and purchase $15 billion in Ukrainian bonds to prop up the country's faltering economy.

As demonstrations gave way to rioting in January 2014, Yanukovych signed a series of laws restricting the right to protest, and hundreds of thousands took to the streets of Kyiv in

response. Bloody clashes between police and protesters ensued, with dozens injured on each side. On January 22 two protesters were killed in skirmishes with police, and demonstrations soon spread to eastern Ukraine, a region that traditionally had supported Yanukovych and closer ties with Russia. Protesters occupied the justice ministry in Kyiv, and the parliament hastily repealed the anti-protest measures. As discussions continued between Yanukovych and opposition leaders, Azarov tendered his resignation as prime minister.

In February hundreds of protesters were released from jail as part of an amnesty deal that led to the evacuation of demonstrators from government buildings. The thaw in tensions was short-lived, however, as opposition parliamentarians were rebuffed in their attempts to limit the powers of the presidency, and the battle in the streets took a deadly turn. More than 20 were killed and hundreds were wounded when government forces attempted to retake the Maidan on February 18. The 25,000 protesters remaining in the square ringed their encampment with bonfires in an attempt to forestall another assault. Protesters in the western Ukrainian cities of Lviv and Ivano-Frankivsk seized government buildings, and EU officials threatened sanctions against Ukraine unless the Yanukovych administration took steps to de-escalate the violence. The proposed truce failed to materialize, and on February 20 violence in Kyiv escalated dramatically, with police and government security forces firing on crowds of protesters. Scores were killed, hundreds were injured, and EU leaders made good on their promise to enact sanctions against Ukraine. Central government control continued to erode in western Ukraine, as opposition forces occupied police stations and government offices in Lutsk, Uzhhorod, and Ternopil.

The bloodiest week in Ukraine’s post-Soviet history concluded on February 21 with an EU-brokered agreement between Yanukovych and opposition leaders that called for early elections and the formation of an interim unity government. The parliament responded by overwhelmingly approving the restoration of the 2004 constitution, thus reducing the power of the presidency. In subsequent votes, the parliament approved a measure granting full amnesty to protesters, fired internal affairs minister Vitaliy Zakharchenko for his role in ordering the crackdown on the Maidan, and decriminalized elements of the legal code under which Tymoshenko had been prosecuted. Yanukovych, his power base crumbling, fled the capital ahead of an impeachment vote that stripped him of his powers as president. Meanwhile, Tymoshenko, who had been released from prison, traveled to Kyiv, where she delivered an impassioned speech to the crowd assembled in the Maidan. Fatherland deputy leader Oleksandr Turchynov was appointed acting president, a move that Yanukovych decried as a coup d’état. On February 24 the interim government charged Yanukovych with mass murder in connection with the deaths of the Maidan protesters and issued a warrant for his arrest.

The Ukrainian economy, struggling prior to the Maidan protests, responded erratically to the shifting power situation, with the hryvnya sinking to historic lows. Credit agency Standard & Poor’s cut the country’s debt rating and downgraded its financial outlook, as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) sought to restore calm. The interim Ukrainian government installed Fatherland leader Arseniy Yatsenyuk as prime minister, and early presidential elections were scheduled for May 2014. Yanukovych resurfaced on February 28

in Rostov-na-Donu, Russia, and he delivered a defiant speech in Russian, insisting that he was still the rightful president of Ukraine.

VII. *PAST INVASIONS*

a. Invasion of Georgia

The protests and popular movements in Georgia in 2003 were called the Rose Revolution, and following the Rose Revolution, Mikheil Saakashvili won the election held in 2004. Saakashvili, as a pro-Western leader, expressed that Georgia should turn towards the West, and this declaration was accepted by the Georgian people. This event and what followed were almost a preview of the invasion of Ukraine, as it was not surprising that Georgia's policy stance, which leaned towards the West, disturbed Russia. Georgia's intensified contacts for NATO and EU memberships brought about Russia's intervention. Just as in today's intervention in Ukraine, Russia recognized the independence of South Ossetia, which held a referendum and chose independence with about 90% of the vote. Consequently, on August 8, 2008, Georgia launched a military operation in South Ossetia, and then Abkhazia also declared its independence and joined the war. Subsequently, Russia began a military intervention in Georgia, resulting in the death and forced displacement of many people, while numerous settlements suffered heavy damage. To summarize the flow of events here: a country in Russia's near belt establishes close cooperation with the EU and NATO, followed by economic and political sanctions from Russia; then an ethnic region of the said country declares independence, asks for help from Russia, and Russia militarily intervenes in that country. It is easy to say that today the scenario in the simplest form during the intervention in Ukraine is exactly like this. As a result of Russia's intervention in Georgia, a ceasefire was signed on August 16, 2008; South Ossetia and Abkhazia unilaterally declared their independence and were officially recognized by Russia on August 26, 2008. Structures such as the EU, NATO, the United Nations, and the Council of Europe were involved in the process with declarations urging the parties to act with restraint, abandon confrontational language, and closely monitor the process at that time.

b. Invasion of Crimea

The Crimean Peninsula was annexed to Ukraine in 1954 and gained the status of an Autonomous Republic within Ukraine through a referendum held in 1991. In Crimea and the Donbas regions in eastern Ukraine, the number of Russians is higher than other ethnic groups. Although Ukrainians in the Donbas region, Ukrainians in the Crimean Peninsula, and Crimean Tatars constantly opposed this situation, the population balance shifted in favor of Russians every year due to the policies of Russian-backed pro-Russian parties. So, why is Crimea so important for Russians? Because Crimea and its important port, Sevastopol, are the only gateways that fulfill Russia's goal of accessing warm waters. Russia's powerful navy is also anchored here. For the occupation of Crimea by the Russians, a public opinion was created within Russia by Putin, claiming that Russian citizens living in Crimea were being persecuted and discriminated against because they spoke Russian and were Russian. In simple terms, on March 11, 2014, both the Crimean Supreme Council and the Sevastopol City Council decided to hold a referendum. According to this decision, if there was a will towards independence in the referendum, it was planned to declare the independence of Crimea and then apply for annexation to Russia. Unsurprisingly, in

Crimea, 96% and in Sevastopol, 95% voted in favor of independence. (The turnout rate for the referendum was approximately 87%). Following the referendum, Putin approved the annexation of Crimea to Russia and then personally entered Crimea with a motorcycle convoy formed by Russian nationalists. Despite all international organizations and actors, Putin annexed Crimea, which is Ukrainian territory, disregarding many international agreements and international law rules. This annexation has gone down in history as one of the most significant violations of international law and agreements since World War II. With the annexation of Crimea, Russia took another milestone on the road to Ukraine.

c. Invasion of Ukraine

With the invasion of South Ossetia followed by the annexation of Crimea, Putin's Russia firmly established a secure outer perimeter under its control and supervision on the southern flank of Russia's external perimeter. Especially Ukraine's efforts and eagerness to cooperate with the EU and NATO, and the encouragement from the EU, NATO, and the US for Ukraine's endeavors, prompted Russia to pursue a more aggressive policy. Not facing insurmountable sanctions during the Georgia and Crimea annexation processes laid the groundwork for Russia to take subsequent steps without hesitation.
The Ukraine-Russia relationship, filled with intense ups and downs, gradually escalated in tension with the annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014, eventually leading to a conventional war at the beginning of 2022.
At the end of 2020, Ukrainian President Zelensky signed decrees approving the NATO partnership and the strategy to liberate Crimea from Russian occupation.
From the beginning of 2021, Russia started amassing military forces along the eastern border of Ukraine, including Crimea, which it had previously annexed, and Belarus. Simultaneously, the narrative began to emerge in public discourse that there was an environment of hatred against Russians in the Donbas region in eastern Ukraine, where the Russian population is dense, amounting to genocide against Russians. From this stage onwards, Putin initiated a series of actions based on heavy disinformation, referred to in the literature as hybrid warfare, which includes the use of mass communication tools, information warfare, proxy armed forces, and cyber warfare. The significant multiplier effect of these non-military warfare tools on the war was also evident in the way Ukrainian President Zelensky used social media and mass communication tools during the subsequent stages of the military intervention. While Russia continued its military buildup, Putin persistently denied the possibility of a military intervention, which was being discussed by the global public.
From early February 2022, there was a noticeable increase in attacks by local militias in the Donbas region and the conflict environment in the region. Finally, on February 24, 2022, pre-recorded videos of Putin were released, announcing the start of a military operation to cleanse Ukraine of Nazism and ensure the safety of Russians in the Donbas region. Although the Russians insistently emphasized that this military operation was not an invasion, the planning and execution of the military operation clearly indicate that it was aimed at the full occupation of Ukraine rather than a regional intervention.
In conventional warfare, the ideal principle of attack is a 1 to 3 ratio. This means that the attacking side's military strength is expected to be three times that of the defending side. Under these conditions, it is assessed that the attack can develop successfully. Despite the

fact that Russia has a much greater superiority over Ukraine when comparing this principle, as of May 15, 2022, Russia has achieved less military progress than expected.
As of now, Russia has taken control of a significant part of eastern and southern Ukraine, but capturing Kyiv and neutralizing Zelensky in a very short time, as Putin expected, has not been achieved. The "Terminator" Putin vs. "Comedian" Zelensky perception that Putin tried to create in the Russian and world public opinion has turned into a significant problem for Putin at this moment. Because despite Putin thinking he would enter Kyiv in 4 days, after 3 months, Zelensky is still in office and fighting, while Putin's armed forces are experiencing great difficulty in advancing further into Ukraine.

IX. *CURRENT SITUATION*

a. Conflicts Current Effects On The World

<u>Realignment - Shifting Alliances:</u>

The realization of a major war breaking out in Europe after almost eight years of a simmering conflict created a political constellation of three different groups of nations: those who sided with Putin's Russia, those who pledged support to Ukraine, and a group of non-aligned nations resisting involvement and/or hedging their bets. European Union (EU) states were quick to respond with major sanctions and action against Russia. Despite some fragmentation – for example, on the oil price cap, and Germany's reluctance to send tanks and other weaponry, the bloc has mainly remained together, against Russian expectations and hopes. 'The EU has shown resolve and, at times surprising, unity in its response to the war,' says Pepijn Bergsen, research fellow in the Chatham House Europe programme.
The UK has been keen to stress its 'special relationship' with Kyiv with a desire especially by former prime minister Boris Johnson to lead the pack with strong rhetoric and military support. The opportunist move, says Chatham House UK in the World Initiative director John Kampfner, is an obvious promotion of its post-Brexit 'Global Britain' credentials.
Elsewhere, there was less solidarity with Ukraine. Putin predictably called in favors of old allies, such as Syria's Bashar al-Assad and Belarus's Aliaksandr Lukashenka and entered a closer strategic relationship with Iran.
A week after the invasion, the UN General Assembly resolution condemning Russia's aggression was passed by an overwhelming majority. However, there were 35 abstentions, among them three Commonwealth states – South Africa, Pakistan, and India. In Asia, only a handful of governments stood strongly with Ukraine – Singapore, South Korea, and Japan. The region's largest rising powers – China, India, and Indonesia – have all refused to take a side.
'While many in the West hoped that Russia's invasion would rally nations in the developing world behind the rules-based order, Asia has largely rejected Western framings of the conflict as a battle between might and right,' says Ben Bland, Chatham House Asia-Pacific programme director. 'Although they might find Russia an increasingly awkward partner, most Asian nations pragmatically choose to maintain their relationships for a combination of economic, military, and diplomatic reasons.
The shift has been mirrored across much of Africa too says Chatham House Africa programme director Dr Alex Vines, highlighting that most abstentions (51 per cent) condemning Russia's invasion at the UN came from African countries, marking a partial resurgence of what was many African nations' default position in the Cold War.

Iran has taken advantage of both tactical and strategic deals, says Chatham House Middle East and North Africa deputy director Dr Sanam Vakil – providing Russia with sanctions busting support and hundreds of attack drones while, in return, Moscow provided surveillance to help Tehran suppress recent domestic protests.

Gap-bridging Turkey has also emerged as a major new diplomatic player – helping broker the grain blockade deal, acting as a humanitarian base for hostage swaps, and hosting (to date, failed) peace talks while simultaneously blocking Finland's, and particularly Sweden's, NATO accession for its own security reasons.

Security(Eu and NATO)

'For many of Russia's neighbors, the Russian invasion of Ukraine confirmed that they had been correct in their analysis of the threat posed by Moscow's regional ambitions,' says Alice Billon-Galland, research fellow in the Europe programme.

Before Russia's invasion, European states, such as France and Germany, had failed to adapt to new geopolitical realities in the region and Russia's actions would lead to a dramatic reappraisal of European security posture. Similarly, the budget from the European Peace Facility, little used before the war in Ukraine, has been employed five times, providing 2.5 billion Euro of cash and hardware for Ukraine's defences.

One conundrum has been that, despite anticipating a full cyber war, major Russian attacks upon Ukraine infrastructure have largely failed to materialize. Although attacks are still relentless and numerous, Ukraine's security has been backed with strengthened NATO cyber security coupled with motivated Ukraine vigilante "cyber army".

It is known that by harnessing the capabilities of satellite imagery, smartphones and social media, Ukrainian forces have 'altered' the traditional kill chain, and outsourced parts of it to civilians reporting Russian movements, thereby building a more 'extensive and resilient network'.

The war could also be seen as the first long-term, sustained conflict where all the currently available uses for drones are integrated into combined operations on both sides.

Necessity of Energy and Food

As two major suppliers of both energy, food and fertilizer commodities, Russia's conflict with Ukraine has caused disruption in supply for both developing and developed countries.



The most fundamental change has been Europe's shift away from reliance on Russian gas. 'Europe will never return to meaningful dependency on Russian fossil fuels,' says Antony Froggatt, deputy director of the Chatham House Environment and Society programme. 'Even if the war finished tomorrow, trust has been broken between European consumers and what has been their primary supplier.'

Europe reacted to the supply disruption in two ways; looking for its gas elsewhere and accelerating the move to renewable energy. Pre-2022, the EU pledged to reduce emissions by 40 per cent and attain 32 per cent renewables. The war has seen those targets raised to 57 per cent and 45 per cent respectively.

With both Russia and Ukraine being major exporters of agricultural fertilizers, the disruption to global food chains drove up prices to all-time highs, fuelling a cost-of-living crisis in both developed and developing nations. Additionally, disruption of both harvests and a Russian grain blockade threatened to create a humanitarian catastrophe in developing countries as many depend on imported wheat. The World Food Programme (WFP) says the crisis remains at 'unprecedented proportions' with ten times the number of people facing famine compared to five years ago.

The Effect on Ukraine

We have to remind ourselves that the war is still ongoing. There has been no ceasefire and the possibility of peace does not seem to be in the picture immediately either.

War is seen as a breach of the sovereignty of a nation. In the present context of Ukraine, it is difficult to state how and to what extent Ukraine would be further affected. No nation would ever wish to be attacked as it threatens its very existence.



In Ukraine, due to the conflict, the health system will continue to collapse as there's damage to hospitals. The staff to handle medical care is declining while the number of people requiring medical intervention has increased. The WHO warned that the oxygen supply to Ukraine is severely low. Also, the risk to public health continues to be threatening as there is the contamination of water and air.

The post-war period will be immensely difficult as there is enormous destruction of infrastructure and a massive economic loss. The humanitarian crisis will be altogether another story that will require years to get even a little better. The hallmark of war is that its consequences are felt long after the war is over and it takes decades to restore and rebuild. Furthermore, the loss of civilian life and its effect on the country's resources is a story that will be grieved for decades.

Ukraine's loss in terms of human life, economy, environment, resources, and infrastructure, is massive. Even with the solidarity and support provided by international organisations and other countries of the world, the country would still require decades to pull itself from the plunge of war.

Possible Implications for Russia

While the implications on Ukraine are evident, the future of Russia will also be a reminder that war affects everybody, including the aggressor. It is believed by some scholars that this war would deteriorate the socio-economic conditions of Russia since the sanctions by the West are already in place. Some hawks are saying that the Russian authorities might lose control of law and order too in case there are large scale protests and opposition to the war within the country. However, on the contrary, it's very much possible for the authorities to gain more control than to lose any. This is because there is some evidence that suggests that there is an influence of anti-liberals and anti-West among the Russian elites who make important decisions. For example, the security services (Siloviki) do not see a failure of negotiations with the West as negative. Instead, they see it as a way to increase their power.
Criticism within the country will deal with repression. The war has already pushed Russia into isolation from the international world. In such a scenario, the government would try to suppress or at the least, control the media. It is expected that the business elite in the country might have to face an economic shock. The truth of Russia's economic condition is a different picture from the government which claims that it is enough for Russia to sustain itself.
It is possible to witness the control of elections by the government. The quest for "traditional values" or conservatism would gain momentum. In case of any expression of dissatisfaction, it would be met by suppression. There could be an increased control of security services within the domestic politics of Russia. However, the actual consequences of the war within Russia would only be known with time and much later in future. One thing that can be said with certainty is that, there will be consequences on the domestic politics of the nation, and they can very much alter Russia's future.



b. Deep Exploring the War

Ukrainian Units in Russia

Ukrainian troops launched a surprise attack across the border in early August, advancing up to 18 miles (30km) into the Russian region of Kursk.
Almost 200,000 people were evacuated from areas along the border by the Russian government and President Vladimir Putin condemned the Ukrainian offensive as a "major provocation".

After two weeks, Ukraine's top commander claimed to control more than 1,200 sq km of Russian territory and 93 villages. The regions of Kursk and Belgorod have both declared a state of emergency. The counter-offensive is seen partly as an attempt to force Russia to redeploy units from the east and relieve pressure on the beleaguered Ukrainian defences there, and partly as a bid to improve Ukraine's chances of a peace settlement.

Russian incursion north of Kharkiv
At the beginning of May 2024, Russian forces crossed the international border to the north of Ukraine's second-biggest city, Kharkiv. Several villages were seized and thousands of civilians fled.

Russia's main offensive has long focused on the eastern Donetsk region, but this was one of the most significant ground assaults since the start of the war and further stretched Ukraine's front-line defences.

The Russian push took place at the end of a four-month period when the US was not supplying weapons to Ukraine, due to a stalemate in the US Congress.
The issue was finally resolved at the end of April, when the US passed a $61bn aid package to provide missiles, artillery and air-defence systems to the Ukrainian military.
Ukrainian forces eventually held firm and even though the city of Kharkiv has come under repeated attack from glide bombs fired by Russian warplanes, it remains beyond the range of Russian artillery.



Russia Grinding Forward in the East
The incursion north of Kharkiv was some distance from the main front line in the east where Russia has continued its offensive operations and been edging forwards since October 2023.
Eastern Ukraine has been contested territory since 2014, when Russian-backed fighters seized large swathes of the eastern Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
Russia's biggest advantage is manpower and it has shown a willingness to throw soldiers at Ukrainian positions to gain a few meters at a time.

About 1,200 Russian soldiers were being killed or wounded every day in May and June, the highest rate since the beginning of the war, according to Western officials.
In recent days, Russian troops have made some significant gains to the north-west of Donetsk and claim to have captured the small town of Niu-York.
The Russian advance towards Pokrovsk is the most notable change in control of the front line near Donetsk for several months.
The last major change came when Ukraine withdrew its troops from Avdiivka, just north of Donetsk, back in February after months of fighting.
Almost all of Avdiivka's pre-war population of more than 30,000 people have left and the town itself is almost completely destroyed.
To the north, areas around Bakhmut have remained a flashpoint and have endured some of the heaviest fighting of the war.
Although Ukraine gained some ground around Chasiv Yar, which is situated on high ground some 10 km west of Bakhmut, Russian forces have since made further advances in the

XII. Critic Things That We Expect From You

In this committee all of you are assigned with the Presidents or the Prime Ministers themselves. As the Co-Under Secretary Generals of Russo-Ukrainian War we want you to write your final document as a peace agreement - as known as a Communique - to at least end up with giving compromises for both sides to maintain the peace of the world.

Firstly we want you to explain the reasons of the conflict briefly to understand the inner sides better. After that you are supposed to talk about the actions that you can take in order to end the war. If you will not be able to discuss and solve the war, you are going to talk about the possible scenarios to understand and implement the dispositions that you may do. We also want you to talk about decreasing the negative effects for both sides to avoid a secondary war at all costs. Last but not least, the most significant thing is to determine the side that will be responsible for the captivated and brutally treated victims to agree on a punishment with the majority to end the committee. Good luck everybody, everything is under your control from now on.

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